

AIR

EQBA-30106

Chief, EE

LB
456

Chief of Base, Berlin

INFO: COS

Operational/CART/CADORY/LOUASOCK

Visit to CAUTERY-1, CABANJO and [] to Frankfurt
Harris Lobbes *Yaco Saevecke*

Reference: EQBA-728hh

1. Two items remain to be reported in order to round out the record of the visit described in Reference: First, the CAUTERY/ [] version of the incident; second, a letter, postmarked 7 February, from CABANJO to CAUTERY which was intercepted by CIS.

2. Meeting with CAUTERY and [] on 12 February, [] (without mentioning the incident as reported to BOB) asked for an outline of what had happened and their impressions of the visit. CAUTERY then responded with the following narrative:

a. CAUTERY was contacted by [] ([] being on leave) and told that the meeting with [] was to take place in the Cafe Kranzler, Frankfurt, on the afternoon of 3 January. ([] had told CAUTERY that [] should not attend, CAUTERY then phoned [] (vacationing in Munich) to let him know that a meeting with [] would take place and the arrangements for it. [] and CAUTERY gave the following reasons for the former's attendance: 1) He was intensely interested in what CABANJO had to say, i.e. development and shortcomings of the Bonn government. 2) He wanted to participate in the discussion with [] whom CAUTERY had praised very highly. Questioned as to the effect of his presence on CABANJO's inclination to disclose "extremely sensitive" information, [] said he came prepared to absent himself at CABANJO's request during the sensitive part of the discussion.

b. CABANJO, CAUTERY, and [] appeared at the Kranzler at about 1300 and took seats. Shortly after their introduction [] learned that CABANJO also had been a member of the Freikorps "Rosa Bach" in the '20's. For both this was significant since such membership indicated a specific political viewpoint which [] considers important to this day. Hence, [] and CABANJO got along well and no question was raised about his presence at the meeting with []

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c. After the three had been seated for about an hour, [] approached CAUTERY and drew him aside. He said [] would not be available for a meeting, and asked if CABANJO would be willing to talk to someone else. CAUTERY relayed this question to CABANJO and received an immediate negative reply. Since the requested meeting with [] was apparently impossible, CABANJO left to return to Bonn, and [] returned to Munich.

d. That evening (according to prearrangement made at the Cafe Kranzler) [] picked up CAUTERY at his pension. They drove to [] home where CAUTERY was very surprised to find [] waiting for them. (CAUTERY commented: Unfortunately CABANJO had already left for Bonn and the purpose of the entire exercise was therefore defeated. Hence, the evening discussion was impromptu and had little, if any, connection with the reason for his being in Frankfurt.) One of the first things CAUTERY noticed on entering the room was a tape recorder. He commented on it in a semi-joking tone and asked if their evening's conversation was to be recorded. [] and [] both made a few joking comments about the recorder, but did not answer CAUTERY's question. CAUTERY therefore assumed that his remarks were being recorded and throughout the discussion guarded himself accordingly.

e. The discussion revolved around relatively harmless subjects, e.g. present operations of LUCASSOCE, CAUTERY's transfer from KUTUBE to LUCAGE type activity, and the welfare of CAUTERY's family. With this, the Frankfurt visit was concluded.

3. Both CAUTERY and [] were indignant over the above chain of events. They thought themselves subjected to a bureaucratic run-around, and thought the incident doubly abortive since PAGE had been available for the requested interview after all. [] commented that this impression was understandable, but that they - [] and CAUTERY - had prepared the surprise which caused the interview's miscarriage, i.e. the unexpected appearance of [] at the Cafe Kranzler. (CAUTERY maintained that [] attendance was not decided upon until CAUTERY phoned [] in Munich, after the arrangements had been made through [] and that [] attendance had not been forbidden by KUBARK. However, [] was never informed of this change.)

4. [] commented that KUBARK was left with a very unfavorable impression of [] and CAUTERY as a result of the incident. It appeared as though [] and CAUTERY (and perhaps CABANJO) had dreamed up the sensitive information story solely in hopes of gaining access to a higher

level of the KUBARK hierarchy. Both C □ and CAUTERY rejected this suggestion immediately, saying they could understand such suspicion, but emphasizing that their sincerity had not been tested because the requested interview with C □ was not granted. CARRICK added that in LOCA SOCK as in other matters related to DOR operations he was relatively content with his handling by KUBARK. But, as illustrated by the present misunderstanding, he had noted incidents of timorousness and unrealism which made cooperation with KUBARK most difficult in West Germany. Finally, he had always considered the Berlin Case Officer as his channel to KUBARK, and had sought a different one in this case only because of the special circumstances surrounding CABANJO and the information he had.

5. [] agreed that the entire affair was unfortunate, and added his opinion that the motives of CAUTERY and [] had not been to circumvent the Case Officer. This opinion rested on a belief that both knew enough about KUBARK methods and were too intelligent to expect such a crude maneuver to bear fruit. Hence, discussion of the incident was concluded in an atmosphere - to outward appearances at least - of mutual confidence.

6. Case Officer Comments:

a. CAUTERNY's reference to a tape recorder was new to me, but of secondary importance to the chain of events as I understand it. (If the conversation was recorded, we would like to have a copy of the tape.)

b. Appearances are that [] and CAUTLEY were attempting an end run around the Case Officer, but I do not feel that an unqualified conclusion to this effect is justified. [] has not betrayed a degree of frustration with his handling in Berlin which would move him to risk seeking another point of access to KUBARK. Further, both he and CAUTLEY had to reckon with the possibility that the request for an interview with [] would be granted and that CABANJO would have to make good on his offer of information. Finally, [] has probably not gained the impression from his present and former CO's that he could get away with such a maneuver vis-a-vis KUBARK.

c. Unfortunately, a final conclusion is difficult because the requested meeting - that between CASANJO and [] - never took place.

7. The letter (copies forwarded under separate cover) referred to above is interesting but does not help, particularly, to clarify the case.

CAUTERY read excerpts from it to the Case Officer on 10 February, evidently hoping to emphasize the purity of their intentions and their disappointment with the outcome. Generally, it supports the story told by CAUTERY. Of course one can also speculate that CAUTERY and CABANJO contrived to write it, on an assumption that it would fall into KUBARK hands. The list of names referred to contains 125 members of the Freikorps Rosbach (with current addresses) which [] regards as a guide to persons of political complexion suitable for cooperation with LCCASOCK.

8. In conclusion, BOB makes no particular recommendations other than the noting of the incident by all concerned and, pending new developments, considering the case closed.